In a recent paper, ‘Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist’, Nomy Arpaly asks two questions: First, can we ever have non-epistemic reasons for believing?
I can't see the point of worrying about whether our reason for valuing information is epistemic or some other kind of reason. But if I were worried about it, I'd invent a new label like meta-epistemic.
Yeah, I tend to agree that the classification of reasons isn't so interesting. My main interest is in whether we can provide an account of evidential support that could do the sort of work that Arpaly would like it to do. So in some ways the blogpost is just a vehicle for me to rant about objectivism!
I can't see the point of worrying about whether our reason for valuing information is epistemic or some other kind of reason. But if I were worried about it, I'd invent a new label like meta-epistemic.
Yeah, I tend to agree that the classification of reasons isn't so interesting. My main interest is in whether we can provide an account of evidential support that could do the sort of work that Arpaly would like it to do. So in some ways the blogpost is just a vehicle for me to rant about objectivism!