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I suppose I disagree with your 'collectivist selves' construct in at least 3 ways:

1. i think we dont sufficiently live our present lives (certainly what my 102yr old grandma says)

thus, your past-self should have zero input into decision-making, and it basically doesnt have any means outside those provided by the society (living wills, etc). i think your concern for your future-self, in western/capitalist econs, follows essentially an exponential curve, with a spike around whenever it is you (think you will) retire. i think the point you should take from your experience w/ the cognitively impaired is that we arent living our present very well.

2. i think you misunderstand, or certainly left unaddressed, the purpose of the legal mechanisms (which are the only possible one's the past-self can influence the present-self) which are there for when a self needs a care-giver. at this point there is no longer just the individual (even the collective-self) but 2 or more present-selves in relation. i think it then becomes pretty clear that the purpose of these is to support the care-giver in their dealings w/ the future-self when the bulk of their relationship has been with the past-self. i think this philosophy is too individualistic and missing (obviously my opinion) that the foundation of all this is the relationship with others, a la care ethics.

3. i was wondering your relationship to EA. i did go poke around and am not surprized you have some affinity. im glad to hear longtermism give you some pause .. so i wonder how that ought to inform how a collective-self should care about its future-self? the lesson from EA is that longtermism is quite dangerous: i (severely) minimizes the present for the future.

this is probably unfair as it is "just" a blog post, so ...

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